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A FIRST AMENDMENT BREACH:  
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY’S ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM  
Caitlin Thistle∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 16, 2005, journalists revealed that the U.S. gov-
ernment performed electronic surveillance on its citizens without a 
warrant or any other prior judicial involvement.1  The government 
initially justified the National Security Agency’s warrantless surveil-
lance program (“NSA program”) with the asserted need for protec-
tion of national security, in light of the attacks on September 11, 
2001.2  In response to increasing criticism of the program, President 
George W. Bush relied on both executive authority in Article II of the 
Constitution and the 2001 Congressional Authorization for the Use 
of Military Force3 (AUMF) as authorization for these wartime meas-
ures.4  The revelation of the NSA program provoked reporters to 
identify several problems with the administration’s program.5  Com-
mentators argued that the program violated both the Foreign Intelli-
 ∗ J.D. 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. 2005, Colgate University.  I 
wish to thank Professor Azmy for all of his help and guidance during this whole writ-
ing process.  I would also like to thank my parents, Peter and Susie, and my fiancé 
Mark for supporting and encouraging me throughout law school.  
 1 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 2 See Dan Eggen & Charles Lane, On Hill, Anger and Calls for Hearings Greet News of 
Stateside Surveillance, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2005, at A1; Press Release, American Bar 
Ass’n, Majority of Americans Say President Should Not Suspend Constitutional Free-
doms without Court Order or Congressional Authorization (Feb. 10, 2006), available 
at http://www.abanet.org/media/releases/news021006.html. 
 3 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
 4 Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, Cong. Research 
Serv., Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to 
Gather Foreign Intelligence Information 27, 30, 33 (Jan. 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf. 
 5 See, e.g., Hope Yen, Probe Sought on NSA Surveillance; Members of Congress Question 
Legality of Bush’s Authorization, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2005, at A5. 
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gence Surveillance Act (FISA)—a statute that places limits on surveil-
lance of U.S. citizens for intelligence gathering purposes6—and the 
Fourth Amendment because of the government’s failure to obtain 
warrants.7
The courts are in tension as to whether the NSA program vio-
lates both the First and Fourth Amendments.8  There is arguably a 
connection between the First and Fourth Amendments and the im-
portant role that both play in protecting U.S. citizens from invasions 
of privacy, the type of intrusions that the NSA program perpetrates.9  
Legal commentators have not paid much attention to the additional 
and independent First Amendment concerns with the NSA program 
that were raised by the district court and the circuit court’s dissenting 
opinion in ACLU v. NSA.  This Comment seeks to address these con-
cerns. 
Congress proposed various amendments to FISA supposedly in 
order to cure any question of the NSA program’s validity and to allow 
for more flexibility in foreign intelligence surveillance.  Various 
members of the House and Senate proposed four separate bills, each 
amending FISA in a different way.10  The motivation behind these 
bills was to eliminate the warrant requirement under FISA and grant 
the executive branch the power to engage in warrantless wiretapping 
on U.S. citizens who place calls to foreign countries.11  Most recently, 
the executive branch changed its position on the NSA program and 
stated that any surveillance would be subject to FISA court approval.12  
 6 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–1862 (West 
2003 & Supp. 2007). 
 7 Id.  
 8 See ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 775–76 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (holding that 
the NSA program violates both the First and Fourth Amendments), vacated, 493 F.3d 
644 (6th Cir. 2007).  The government appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit in a two to one split held that the particular plaintiffs do not have 
standing to challenge the program on any claims, including the First Amendment.  
ACLU, 493 F.3d at 673.  The majority refused to rule on the legality of the program; 
however, the dissenting opinion not only found that the plaintiffs had standing, but 
also vehemently argued that the NSA program violated FISA and the Constitution.  
Id. at 720 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
 9 See infra Part III. 
 10 See S. 3931, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 2455, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 3001, 109th 
Cong. (2006); H.R. 585, 109th Cong. (2006); see also ACLU Comparison Chart of 
NSA Legislation (Sept. 29, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/ 26978leg 
20060929.html [hereinafter ACLU Comparison Chart]. 
 11 See Dan Eggen, Surveillance Bill Meets Resistance in Senate, WASH. POST, July 21, 
2006, at A9. 
 12 Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, 
Comm. on Judiciary, and Arlen Specter, Ranking Minority Member, Comm. on Judi-
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This new decision is still a source of controversy because of the gov-
ernment’s failure to provide specific details about the program and 
its overall delay in implementing these new procedures. 
The legislative enactments and the asserted change of position 
by the administration, however, would not obviate all of the constitu-
tional infirmities of the NSA program.  Even if the enactments re-
move any Fourth Amendment objections to the program, this Com-
ment argues that the program independently violates the First 
Amendment.  Specifically, this Comment argues that the NSA pro-
gram violates the First Amendment associational rights of individuals 
subject to surveillance.  Thus, the government must have a compel-
ling state interest to excuse such a wholesale violation of constitu-
tional rights.  The government presumably justifies this violation of 
First Amendment rights by invoking the all-encompassing interest of 
national security, a justification this Comment argues is too broad in 
itself.  Moreover, the NSA program circumvents the Fourth Amend-
ment, which often works to protect First Amendment rights, because 
the government is neither obtaining a warrant nor satisfying FISA re-
quirements. 
This Comment seeks to unhinge the First Amendment analysis 
from the Fourth Amendment inquiry typically used to analyze gov-
ernment surveillance programs.  In order to protect First Amend-
ment associational rights, a separate inquiry is required.  The gov-
ernment must demonstrate that the NSA program has sufficient 
procedural safeguards to be narrowly tailored to meet a genuine 
compelling state interest.  This Comment relies on ACLU v. NSA as an 
example of how the government’s surveillance program violates the 
First Amendment right of freedom of association and that, in order 
to protect this interest, the First Amendment may require additional 
procedural safeguards of its own.  
Part II traces the history of FISA and government surveillance up 
through the most recent NSA surveillance program.  Part III discusses 
FISA’s warrant requirement and demonstrates that this requirement 
is essential to the Act’s constitutionality.  This Part argues that the ab-
sence of a warrant requirement in the NSA program, examined in 
the district court’s opinion in ACLU v. NSA, also raises serious inde-
pendent First Amendment concerns.  Part IV discusses the First 
Amendment violation created by the NSA program, describing the 
nature of the harm at issue as harm to freedom of association, which 
requires a compelling state interest with the least restrictive means of 
ciary (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/poli-
tics/20060117gonzales_Letter.pdf. 
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invasion.  Part V then discusses the idea of applying Fourth Amend-
ment requirements to a First Amendment inquiry.  It highlights the 
concerns with this application, specifically discussed in Zurcher v. Stan-
ford Daily13 and Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press v. AT&T Co.,14 
and dismisses these concerns as not applicable to the NSA program.  
Part VI proposes that the easiest way to satisfy the First Amendment is 
to obtain a warrant and use Fourth Amendment procedures.  How-
ever, if this is not possible, the First Amendment requires an inde-
pendent inquiry of its own, essentially placing the requirement of 
strict scrutiny ex ante as opposed to the current ex post examination. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
SURVEILLANCE ACT AND GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 
Historically, presidents justified the use of warrantless surveil-
lance as necessary for matters involving national security.15  Virtually 
every president from Abraham Lincoln to Franklin Roosevelt author-
ized some type of warrantless surveillance during wartime to intercept 
the conversations of suspected spies.16  Congress first attempted to 
regulate electronic surveillance in 1968 through Title III of the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (“Title III”).17  Title III 
permitted law enforcement agents to use electronic surveillance only 
if a reviewing judge found probable cause to believe the target “is 
committing, has committed, or is about to commit” a particular enu-
merated offense, and that the surveillance would obtain incriminat-
ing communications about the offense.18  Even with this Act in place, 
the executive enjoyed great discretion to undertake surveillance for 
national security and virtually limitless power to engage in surveil-
lance for foreign security channels.19  Increasingly, scandals arose as 
the executive continued to invoke surveillance under the guise of na-
 13 436 U.S. 547 (1987). 
 14 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 15 Adam Burton, Fixing FISA for Long War:  Regulating Warrantless Surveillance in the 
Age of Terrorism, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 381, 384 (2006). 
 16 Id.  For example, President Lincoln authorized eavesdropping of telegraphed 
messages in order to detect enemy plans during the Civil War.  Id. 
 17 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801–803, 
82 Stat. 197, 211–225 (1968) (Title III codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2522 (2000)). 
 18 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970). 
 19 Id. § 2511(3) (“Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitu-
tional power of the President . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed 
essential to the security of the United States . . . .”). 
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tional security. 20  These suspect events began to tarnish the American 
public’s belief in the truthfulness and legality of executive actions.21  
Aware of this growing concern, courts tried to limit the amount of 
surveillance conducted, but the holdings did not extend beyond the 
domestic context.22  Congress refused to regulate foreign intelligence 
surveillance and instead “left presidential powers where it found 
them.”23  Even greater skepticism of the government’s limitless au-
thority emerged during the Watergate scandal, prompting the crea-
tion of a special congressional committee—the Church Committee—
to investigate the issue.24
In 1975 and 1976 the Church Committee published fourteen 
reports on the U.S. intelligence agencies and their alleged deficien-
cies and proposed certain recommendations to address these con-
cerns.25  One of these recommendations was FISA26 and the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC),27 which would oversee inves-
tigation of foreign suspects inside the United States.  Congress ap-
proved FISA in 1978 with the goal of implementing a “secure frame-
work”28 by which the executive could obtain vital intelligence 
information while still adhering to the nation’s goal of commitment 
to privacy and individual rights.29
 20 Arthur S. Lowry, Note, Who’s Listening: Proposals for Amending the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act, 70 VA. L. REV. 297, 311–13 (1984). 
 21 See id. 
 22 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment protections extended to electronic surveillance but failing to extend 
this holding to matters of national security); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 
407 U.S. 297 (1972) (holding that the executive did not have the power to authorize 
domestic electronic surveillance without prior judicial approval). 
 23 Keith, 407 U.S. at 303. 
 24 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 7 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3904, 3908 (stating that abuses in electronic surveillance “were initially illuminated 
in 1973 during the investigation of the Watergate break-in” and that further abuses 
were shown by the Church Committee). 
 25 See Assassination Archives & Research Ctr., Church Committee Reports  
(1976), http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm [herein-
after Church Committee Reports] (providing links to all fourteen reports). 
 26 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–1862 (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2007). 
 27 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2000). 
 28 ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting S. 
REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 15 (1977), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3916)). 
 29 Id. 
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A. FISA Standards 
FISA established the standards for obtaining a court order for 
foreign intelligence surveillance.30  The FISC, initially seating seven 
district court judges, grants court orders approving electronic surveil-
lance.31  In order for a federal officer to obtain authorization, the at-
torney general must certify the application after several criteria are 
met.  First, the application must state the “identity, if known, or a de-
scription of the specific target of the electronic surveillance.”32  Sec-
ond, the officer must submit a statement of the reasons for his belief 
that “the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power” and that the place at which the electronic 
surveillance is directed is used by that target.33  Third, the application 
must contain “a detailed description of the nature of the information 
sought and the type of communications or activities to be subjected 
to the surveillance.”34  Last, the certifying official must state that he 
believes the surveillance will obtain foreign intelligence informa-
tion.35
After the official properly submits the application, the FISC will 
grant an ex parte court order if the court deems that, on the basis of 
the facts, “there is probable cause to believe that the target of the 
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power”36 and that the place where the surveillance is being directed is 
 30 50 U.S.C. § 1802(b) (2000); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 
1984). 
 31 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000).  The number has been amended numerous times.  
In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the court from seven to eleven judges and 
required that at least three of the judges be from within twenty miles of the District 
of Columbia.  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-56, § 208, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (Supp. I 2001)). 
 32 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804(a)(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007). 
 33 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4)(A) (2000).  FISA includes several definitions of “for-
eign power” and “agent of a foreign power.”  Most pertinent to this Comment, “FISA 
defines ‘foreign power’ to include a group engaged in international terrorism or ac-
tivities in preparation therefor.’” Duggan, 743 F.2d at 69 (citing § 1801(a)(4)).  “An 
‘agent of a foreign power’ is defined to include both ‘any person other than a United 
States person, who . . . acts in the United States as . . . a member of a foreign power . . 
.’ and ‘any person who . . . knowingly engages in . . . international terrorism, or ac-
tivities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power.’”  Id. 
(citing § 1801(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(C)). 
 34 § 1804(a)(6). 
 35 Id. § 1804(a)(7)(A). 
 36 Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (“[N]o United States person may be considered a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by 
the first amendment . . . .”). 
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used by that target.37  This standard is much less stringent than under 
Title III, which required that a crime is being, had been, or would be 
committed for surveillance to take place.38
Even so, it may appear that FISA makes it difficult for the gov-
ernment to obtain a court order to conduct surveillance.39  This is not 
the case at all; in fact, through the end of 2004, the FISC rejected 
only five applications while granting 18,781 warrants.40  Also, even if 
the government cannot obtain a warrant, there is an emergency pro-
cedure under FISA which authorizes the government to conduct sur-
veillance without a court order.41  FISC will grant the emergency or-
der if the attorney general determines that immediate action is 
needed with respect to electronic surveillance.42  The order is valid 
for seventy-two hours before it must be reviewed by the court.43  
After September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT 
Act44 to amend several portions of FISA.  Two of the amendments to 
FISA are relevant here because both enhanced the president’s ability 
to collect foreign intelligence within the United States.45  The first 
amendment lowered the surveillance standard.  Previously, the col-
 37 Id. § 1805(a)(5). 
 38 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2000). 
 39 See William Kristol & Gary Schmitt, Vital Presidential Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 
2005, at A31. 
 40 See Federation of American Scientists, FISA Annual Reports Made to Congress, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/index.html#rept (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).  
In 2005 and 2004, none of the applications submitted by the government were de-
nied. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Hon. J. Dennis 
Hastert, Speaker of H. Rep. (Apr. 28, 2006), available at  http:// www.fas.org/irp/ 
agency/doj/fisa/2005rept.html; Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., to Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of H. Rep. (Apr. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2004rept.pdf.  In 2003, four applications 
were denied.  Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Ralph 
Mecham, Dir. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts (Apr. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2003rept.pdf.  In 2002, 2001, and 2000, all 
applications were approved, and only a few were modified prior to approval.  Letter 
from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to Ralph Mecham, Dir. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts 
(Apr. 29, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2002rept.html; 
Letter from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of H. Rep. 
(Apr. 29, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2001rept.html; 
Letter from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to Hon. Richard B. Cheney, Pres. Sen., (Apr. 
27, 2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2000rept.html.
 41 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802(a)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007). 
 42 Id. 
 43 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(4) (2000). 
 44 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scat-
tered sections of U.S.C.). 
 45 See Grayson A. Hoffman, Note, Litigating Terrorism: The New FISA Regime, the 
Wall and the Fourth Amendment, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2003). 
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lection of foreign intelligence information had to be the sole or pri-
mary purpose of the investigation; post-PATRIOT Act, it need only be a 
significant purpose of the investigation.46  Second, the Act further ex-
panded FISA to permit “roving wiretap” authority, which allows the 
interception of any communication without specifying the particular 
telephone line, computer, or other facility to be monitored.47  Al-
though the amendments gave more power to the executive, FISA still 
requires that the government meet all of its procedures and obtain a 
court order before conducting foreign intelligence surveillance.48  
B. Warrantless Surveillance by the Government 
Despite the high number of court orders granted by the FISC 
and the emergency procedures already in place, the government still 
engages in warrantless electronic surveillance on foreign agents 
within the United States.49  The NSA implemented its program some-
time after September 11, 2001, and it remained a secret until a New 
York Times article revealed its existence.50  The exact details of the 
NSA program, labeled the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) by 
the government,51 are unknown.  Under this program, reauthorized 
by President Bush over thirty times since 2001,52 the NSA intercepts 
communications without a warrant or any form of court order.53  It 
gathers information without the authorization of either the President 
or the Attorney General, but instead uses its own discretion to find 
probable cause that the target of the surveillance is associated with al 
Qaeda.54  This program in no way complies with the procedures set 
out by FISA; indeed, according to General Michael Hayden, then-
Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, the NSA pro-
 46 USA PATRIOT Act, § 218, 115 Stat. at 291. 
 47 Id. § 206, 115 Stat. at 282. 
 48 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a). 
 49 See e.g., Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1, at A1; see also President George W. 
Bush, State of the Union Address at the U.S. Capitol (Jan. 31, 2006), (transcript 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/index.html) [here-
inafter 2006 State of the Union Address]. 
 50 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1, at A1. 
 51 2006 State of the Union Address, supra note 50. 
 52 Bush Says He Signed NSA Wiretap Order, CNN, Dec. 17, 2005, available at http:// 
www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/17/bush.nsa/. 
 53 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, 
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204) (informa-
tion taken from plaintiff’s statement of undisputed material facts). 
 54 Id. at 2−3. 
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gram, “is a more . . . ‘aggressive’ program than would be traditionally 
available under FISA.”55  
The NSA claims that the program intercepts only international 
communications and that the authority to do so is reviewed every 
forty-five days by the General Counsel and the Inspector General of 
the NSA.56  The NSA further explains that the program only inter-
cepts those calls entering or leaving the United States that involve 
someone associated with al Qaeda.57  Yet, despite the government’s 
assurances, there is evidence to show that NSA surveillance is not tar-
geted at specific individuals. 58  Instead the NSA program uses data 
mining to amass information mostly about the calls of ordinary 
Americans who are not even suspected of a crime.59  The calling pat-
terns are then analyzed in order to detect terrorist activity.60  Despite 
these allegations, the Department of Justice firmly assures the public 
that it is not using the program to spy on innocent citizens but rather 
to focus narrowly on international calls associated with al Qaeda.61  
The NSA claims that its power to engage in this kind of surveillance 
stems from two sources: the September 18, 2001, AUMF authorizing 
“all necessary and appropriate force” to engage in war with those re-
sponsible for the September 11 attacks;62 and Article II, Section 2 of 
the U.S. Constitution, which, the administration argues, grants the 
president inherent executive authority to take necessary measures to 
protect national security during wartime. 63
C. Proposed Amendments and Compliance with FISA 
Recently, members of Congress have proposed legislation to 
change the scope of FISA to allow more flexibility in foreign intelli-
 55 Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hay-
den, Principal Deputy Dir. for Nat’l Intelligence (Jan. 12, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html. 
 56 Friends Committee on National Legislation, The White House Defines NSA 
Myths vs. Realities (Oct. 17, 2007), http://www.fcnl.org (follow “Civil Liberties” hy-
perlink under “Issues”; then follow “Privacy Issues” hyperlink; follow “The White 
House Defines NSA Myths vs. Realities” hyperlink under “Resources”) [hereinafter 
NSA Myths]. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY, 
May 11, 2006, at A1. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 NSA Myths, supra note 56. 
 62 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
 63 Bazan & Elsea, supra note 4, at 27, 30, 33. 
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gence surveillance.  Each bill proposes different amendments to FISA 
to deal with the president’s authority regarding the NSA program.64  
One recent bill presented by former Senate Majority Leader, William 
Frist, titled the Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, would change 
many provisions of FISA, including a change that would allow war-
rantless surveillance of Americans’ international calls and e-mails 
without any evidence of a relationship to al Qaeda.65  In addition, the 
Wilson Bill proposed to change the definition of “electronic surveil-
lance” to authorize surveillance of Americans’ phone calls.66  The bill 
specifically allows for the interception of communication either 
“from the . . . United States to overseas, or from overseas to the 
United States . . . without a court order so long as the government is 
not intentionally targeting a known person in the U.S.”67  This bill 
would “permit . . . vastly expanded government wiretapping of inno-
cent Americans without a warrant and without probable cause.”68  
Congress has not yet made any decisions regarding new legislation. 
Even more recently, the Bush Administration announced its in-
tention to comply with FISA when engaging in foreign surveillance.  
A letter from then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, stated that the 
President is committed to using lawful tools to protect the country 
and to developing a new program with the approval of FISA.69  How-
ever, the Administration has not revealed details about the program 
or its compliance,70 leading to the conclusion that the NSA program 
 64 S. 3931, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 2455, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 3001, 109th 
Cong. (2006); H.R. 5825, 109th Cong. (2006); see also ACLU Comparison Chart, su-
pra note 10. 
 65 S. 3931, 109th Cong. (2006). This Bill would change FISA’s definition so that 
the interception of calls and e-mails of American residents and businesses would no 
longer need a warrant unless the sender and all of recipients are within the United 
States.  Id. at § 9(b). 
 66 Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, H.R. 5825, 109th Cong. §2(b) 
(2006). 
 67 Republican Vision of National Security: Republicans Move to Legalize Spying of Ameri-
cans, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 28, 2006, at A1 (citing Press Release, Rep. Louise M. 
Slaughter, D-N.Y.).  H.R. 5825 authorizes warrantless surveillance and searches of 
Americans for ninety days.  Id.  H.R. 5825 allows for warrantless electronic surveil-
lance and physical searches of Americans after an “armed attack,” a “terrorist attack,” 
or in anticipation of an “imminent attack.”  Id. 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id. 
 70 See Donna Leinwand, Court to Oversee Wiretap Program; Lack of Warrants Fed Con-
troversy, USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 2007, at A1; Eric Lichtblau & David Johnston, Court Un-
changed to Oversee U.S. Wiretapping in Terror Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A1;  
Richard B. Schmitt, Greg Miller & David G. Savage, The Nation; Wiretap Review Plan Is 
Still Unclear; Bush and Gonzales Say the Domestic Spying Is Essentially Except for Its Legal 
Justification, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A12. 
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remains the same.  President Bush noted that “[n]othing has 
changed in the program except the court has said we’ve analyzed it 
and it’s a legitimate way to protect the country.”71  Because the ad-
ministration failed to provide any specific information about the ex-
tent of its compliance with FISA, the administration’s decision—
leaving open the possibility that in fact nothing has changed—does 
not affect the scope of this Comment.  First, declining to address the 
merits of the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 
ACLU v. NSA ruled only that plaintiffs lacked standing.  This case is 
on appeal to the Supreme Court and has yet to be ruled moot.  Sec-
ond, the debate still continues as to the exact role FISA is playing.  
Last, at any moment the president may revoke the program and re-
implement it without complying with FISA. 
III. THE WARRANT AS A FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
A. FISA Does Not Violate the First Amendment Due to the  
Warrant Requirement  
Congress enacted FISA in order to curb the executive’s power 
over surveillance and the invasion of both the First and Fourth 
Amendments by creating a “secure framework by which the executive 
branch [could] conduct legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign 
intelligence” while meeting Fourth Amendment requirements.72  
However, immediately after Congress enacted FISA, it was challenged 
under the First Amendment.73   
In United States v. Falvey,74 defendants, all of Irish ancestry, were 
accused of smuggling arms and equipment to the Irish Republican 
Army.75  The defendants argued that FISA violated their First 
Amendment rights by allowing the government to use politically mo-
tivated surveillance of whatever group it chooses at a particular 
time.76  The defendants claimed the surveillance would cause Ameri-
can sympathizers of these groups to be afraid to exercise their First 
Amendment rights for fear that their privacy would be invaded by 
 71 Schmitt, Miller & Savage, supra note 70, at A12. 
 72 United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1311 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting S. 
REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 15 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3916); see 
also S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 7 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908. 
 73 See John J. Dvorske, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Authorizing Electronic Surveillance of Foreign Powers and 
Their Agents, 190 A.L.R. FED. 385 (2003). 
 74 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 75 Id. at 1307. 
 76 Id. 
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FISA.77  The district court, rejecting this argument, held that FISA was 
not overbroad and did not violate the First Amendment by creating a 
chilling effect because of the specific protection in FISA that a war-
rant be issued before a court.78  The court also found that the re-
quirement that a judge and not the executive make the finding that a 
person is the agent of a foreign power before granting a warrant pre-
vents any abuse of political groups.79  FISA specifically states that no 
person may be deemed an agent of a foreign power based solely on 
activities protected by the First Amendment.80  Therefore, for the 
government to obtain a FISA warrant there must be more suspicion 
than just a person’s association with a particular political group.81  
Based on these protections, the court held that FISA does not violate 
the First Amendment.82
B. The Lack of a Warrant in ACLU v. NSA 
In ACLU v. NSA,83 the plaintiffs84 alleged that the NSA program85 
violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights.  The program au-
thorized government officials to intercept without obtaining a war-
rant the international telephone or Internet communications of a 
number of persons and organizations within the United States.86  The 
district court held that this program violated the Fourth Amend-
ment87 and, even more relevant for this Comment, the First Amend-
ment.88
 77 Id. at 1314. 
 78 Id. at 1315. 
 79 Id. at 1314. 
 80 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2000). 
 81 Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1315. 
 82 Id. 
 83 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 84 Under FISA, plaintiffs are defined as U.S. persons that have a rational belief 
that they have been subjected to government interceptions.  Id. at 758. 
 85 The government has termed the program the Terrorist Surveillance Program 
(TSP).  2006 State of the Union Address, supra note 49.  To prevent confusion, this 
Comment does not use the term TSP, since persons outside the government gener-
ally do not use this terminology. 
 86 ALCU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 758. 
 87 Id. at 775.  The court held that the TSP violated the Fourth Amendment be-
cause the purpose of adopting the Fourth Amendment was to ensure that the Execu-
tive would not abuse its power to search, and thus searches outside the judicial proc-
ess are per se unreasonable.  Id. at 774–75 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
357 (1967)). Reasonableness, which is shown by asserting probable cause before a 
neutral magistrate, is required in all Fourth Amendment searches.  Id. at 775.  The 
TSP completely disregards any of these procedures set forth by FISA.  Id. 
 88 Id. at 775−76. 
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The district court found that the implementation of the NSA 
program caused a chilling effect on First Amendment freedom of as-
sociation rights.89  The district court ruled that the NSA program vio-
lated the First Amendment based on the premise that the Bill of 
Rights was created with the knowledge that “unrestricted power of 
search and seizure could . . . be an instrument for stifling liberty of 
expression.”90  The district court found that without prior judicial ap-
proval, electronic surveillance creates a chilling effect on free speech 
and restricts one’s freedom of association.91  Based on this reasoning, 
the district court held that the NSA program violated the First 
Amendment by giving unrestricted authority to the president to con-
duct electronic surveillance and that the program did not meet the 
First Amendment test of employing the least restrictive means to 
achieve a compelling state interest.92
The district court went on to explain that the NSA program cre-
ated a chilling effect on First Amendment associational rights by ref-
erencing two cases.93  First, in Dombrowski v. Pfister,94 the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that repeated announcements by law 
officers that an organization is subversive or is a communist front 
frightened potential members and caused irreparable harm.95  Sec-
ond, in Zweibon v. Mitchell,96 the district court ruled that tapping an 
organization’s office phone caused members to leave the organiza-
tion since their names would be associated with the organization.97  
The most important concept taken from both cases is that, according 
to the district court in ACLU v. NSA, the only way that the govern-
ment can engage in this kind of invasive surveillance is “upon a show-
ing of a compelling governmental interest; and that the means cho-
sen to further that interest are the least restrictive of freedom of 
belief and association that could be chosen.”98
The government appealed the case, and the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing; 
 89 Id. at 776. 
 90 Id. (citing Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 724, 729 (1961)). 
 91 See id. at 776. 
 92 ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 776. 
 93 Id. at 776. 
 94 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 95 Id. at 488−89. 
 96 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 97 Id. at 634−35. 
 98 ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (citing Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 94 
(D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
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thus, the court did not reach the merits of the case.99  The dissent 
found that plaintiffs100 suffered an actual, concrete, and imminent 
harm sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement.101  The dissent be-
lieved that the NSA program forces plaintiffs to abrogate their duty of 
confidentiality under professional responsibility rules if they commu-
nicate with clients via e-mail or telephone.102  Further, the NSA pro-
gram does not comply with the “minimization procedures” under 
FISA,103 which work to protect privileged communications between 
attorney and client from interception or, if intercepted, from further 
disclosure.104  As explained in the dissenting opinion, the NSA pro-
gram’s failure to comply with minimization procedures forces plain-
tiffs to travel internationally to meet with clients face to face and 
cease telephone and email communications regarding sensitive sub-
jects with overseas clients.105  The plaintiffs fear that communications 
will be intercepted and potentially disclosed, breaching their attor-
ney-client privilege.106  The NSA program does more than create a 
subjective chill on speech; it also leaves plaintiffs with the dilemma of 
choosing between breaching their duty of confidentiality to their cli-
ents and breaching their duty of effective representation.107  The 
plaintiffs’ fear of intercepted communications between themselves 
and clients is reasonable and places a burden on their First Amend-
ment rights, which causes a concrete and imminent injury.108
Further, the dissent argued that the plaintiffs have demonstrated 
a causal connection between the injury complained of and the NSA 
program.109  The plaintiffs can no longer adequately perform their 
jobs in part because of the NSA program.110  If the NSA program did 
 99 ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 696 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 100 Id. at 695 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (focusing on only the attorney plaintiffs 
when discussing the issue of standing, stating that these particular plaintiffs have the 
strong argument for an injury in fact). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 696–97. 
 103 Id. at 696.  FISA’s minimization procedures require that a FISA application for 
surveillance “must include a description of minimization procedures that will be util-
ized to protect privileged communications.”  Id.  These procedures must “‘minimize 
the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly avail-
able information concerning unconsenting United States persons.’”  Id. (citing 50 
U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1)). 
 104 Id. at 695. 
 105 ACLU, 493 F.3d at 696 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
 106 Id. at 697. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 704. 
 110 Id. 
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not exist, plaintiffs would be protected by the minimization proce-
dures set forth under FISA and would not have to cease telephone 
and electronic communication with overseas clients.111  Lastly, the dis-
sent argued that the plaintiffs’ injury is realized whether or not plain-
tiffs know that they are being subjected to government surveillance.112  
Plaintiffs owe ethical obligations to their clients regardless of whether 
the communications with clients are actually being intercepted.113  
The plaintiffs have been injured professionally and personally be-
cause of the NSA program.  They were unable to speak freely with 
their clients, and thus their speech is chilled in violation of the First 
Amendment. 
The majority in ACLU v. NSA disagreed with the dissent’s analy-
sis and instead dismissed the case for lack of standing and failed to 
reach any discussion of the merits.114  The Supreme Court previously 
ruled that plaintiffs need only show the reasonableness of the fear 
that leads the plaintiffs to respond in a way that may cause them some 
harm or injury.115  However, the majority ignored this point and 
claimed that the plaintiffs may have suffered a subjective chill but not 
a concrete, actual, or subjective injury to meet the standing require-
ment.116  The majority found that since no plaintiff can demonstrate 
that he or she has personally been subjected to surveillance, plaintiffs 
are unable to meet the standing requirement.117  The majority held  
that even if it found any injury in fact that plaintiffs’ were unwilling to 
contact their overseas clients due to fear that the NSA would inter-
cept their communications, there was still no causation.118  The ma-
jority argued that the absence of the warrant is not the cause of this 
fear, because even if a valid warrant were granted plaintiffs would not 
necessarily know of the warrant.119  In finding that plaintiffs lacked 
standing, the majority does not even acknowledge the idea of mini-
mization that is the crux of the dissent’s argument; it also fails to rec-
 111 ACLU, 493 F.3d at 704 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
 112 Id. at 705. 
 113 Id. at 706. 
 114 Id. at 673 (majority opinion).  The majority separately analyzed each of plain-
tiff’s six claims to determine if plaintiffs had standing on any claim.  However, this 
Part of the Comment focuses on the majority’s analysis of the standing requirement 
for the First Amendment claims. 
 115 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
184 (2000); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 475 (1987). 
 116 ACLU, 493 F.3d at 652–57. 
 117 Id. at 662. 
 118 Id. at 667. 
 119 Id. at 668. 
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ognize the concrete injury that attorney plaintiffs suffer in not being 
able to speak openly with their clients. 
The district court’s decision and the court of appeals’s dissent in 
ACLU v. NSA make plausible the argument that warrantless wiretap-
ping violates the First Amendment, though it does not provide a fully 
theorized account of the arguments.120  This Comment attempts to 
bolster this First Amendment claim by showing that national security 
is not a compelling enough state interest to justify a violation of First 
Amendment rights in this context.  Even further, this Comment ar-
gues that if national security can be invoked as a compelling interest, 
then the government nevertheless fails to use the least restrictive 
means to satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement.  This Comment 
proposes that a First Amendment claim needs an inquiry of its own, 
separate and apart from the Fourth Amendment, in order to fully 
protect First Amendment associational rights. 
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATION 
A. The History of First Amendment Freedom of Association:  
Strict Scrutiny 
The nature of the harm imposed by the NSA program is an in-
fringement on freedom of association.121  When the government un-
dertakes an action which inflicts an obvious injury on the individual 
solely because of his lawful belief, “it has the direct and consequential 
effect of chilling his rights to freedom of belief and association.”122  
Because of the great interest in not restricting First Amendment 
rights, the Supreme Court has held that “such governmental actions 
may be justified only upon a showing of a paramount or vital gov-
ernmental interest.”123  The government must meet this burden as 
well as demonstrate that the means chosen to further its compelling 
interest are those least restrictive of freedom of belief and associa-
tion.124  Strict scrutiny review is necessary because “when a [s]tate at-
tempts to make inquiries about a person’s beliefs or associations, its 
 120 The district court argument focuses on the Fourth Amendment violation, only 
briefly mentioning the First Amendment violation.  ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 
754, 773−77 (E.D. Mich. 2006).  The appellate court dissent discusses only briefly the 
First Amendment violation and the merits of the case because the ultimate issue on 
appeal was standing.  ACLU, 439 F.3d at 660. 
 121 See supra notes 49−63, 83−108 and accompanying text. 
 122 Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 123 Id. (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976)). 
 124 Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362−63. 
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power is limited by the First Amendment.  Broad and sweeping state 
inquiries into these protected areas . . . discourage citizens from ex-
ercising rights protected by the Constitution.”125
First Amendment rights are often infringed upon in government 
investigations.126  Disastrous effects can occur if there are abuses of 
the investigative process which reveal information “about a person’s 
‘beliefs, expressions, or associations . . . concern[ing] matters that are 
unorthodox, unpopular, or even hateful to the general public.’”127  
The First Amendment protects the rights of all citizens to hold any 
political belief and to belong to any lawful political party or associa-
tion.128  Strict scrutiny review is necessary even if a deterrent effect on 
the exercise of First Amendment rights arises only as an unintended 
result of the government’s conduct.129
The Supreme Court first recognized the right of freedom of as-
sociation in NAACP v. Alabama,130 holding that the right protected the 
NAACP from having to disclose the names of its members to state of-
ficials.131  The Court believed that freedom of association was funda-
mental to First Amendment rights because effective advocacy of both 
public and private points of view, especially controversial ones, is 
greatly enhanced by group association.132  Thus, the Court recognized 
the vital relationship between freedom of association and privacy in 
one’s associations.133  The Court stated that investigations into the 
names of the group’s members “may induce members to withdraw . . . 
and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of 
their beliefs . . . and of the consequences of this exposure.”134  There-
 125 Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) (holding that the First Amend-
ment prevented the State Bar from barring an applicant solely on his or her mem-
bership in a certain political organization). 
 126 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967); see also Linda E. Fisher, 
Guilt by Expressive Association:  Political Profiling, Surveillance and Privacy of Groups, 46 
ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 646–54 (2004). 
 127 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 38, 
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204) (quoting 
Watkins v. United States 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957)). 
 128 Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356–57. 
 129 Id. at 362 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65 (1976)). 
 130 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 131 Id. at 466.  The government claimed that it needed a list of the members of the 
NAACP in order to determine if the organization was conducting intrastate business 
in violation of an Alabama statute.  Id. at 453.  The Court held that the link was not 
substantial enough to require production of the list.  Id. at 458−60. 
 132 Id. at 460. 
 133 Id. at 462. 
 134 Id. at 463; see also Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 
(1963); Paton v. LaPrade, 469 F. Supp. 773 (D.N.J. 1978). 
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fore, the Court held that due to the serious harm that can occur, the 
government’s conduct is subject to strict scrutiny.135
Clark v. Library of Congress136 demonstrates the type of harm that 
can affect a member of an association.  In Clark, the plaintiff brought 
an action against his employer, the Library of Congress, for its inves-
tigation into his political beliefs and activities.137  The FBI launched a 
full-fledged investigation into the plaintiff’s activities after he at-
tended several meetings of the Young Socialist Alliance, a group af-
filiated with the Socialist Workers Party.138  As a result of the investiga-
tion, family and friends specifically advised the plaintiff that he 
should cease his political activities.139  The plaintiff not only suffered 
great mental anguish but was chilled in the exercise of his First 
Amendment associational rights.140  The court held that the Library 
failed to demonstrate the existence of any legitimate or compelling 
justification for investigating the plaintiff.141  The court stated that in-
vestigations of this manner are at times justifiable, but in this instance 
the only basis for the investigation was minimal information regard-
ing the plaintiff’s association with a lawful political group.142  This 
case clearly shows that the government must present a compelling in-
terest other than the fear that a person is associating with an unpopu-
lar political group. 
Zweibon v. Mitchell143 further deals with the idea that unfettered 
government surveillance can abridge one’s right to freedom of asso-
ciation.  In Zweibon, the defendants, John Mitchell, then Attorney 
 135 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460–62; see also Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546.  The Gibson Court 
explained that: 
[I]t is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which 
intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights of speech, 
press, association and petition that the State convincingly show a sub-
stantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and 
compelling state interest.  Absent such a relation between the N.A.A.C.P. 
and conduct in which the State may have a compelling regulatory con-
cern, the Committee has not “demonstrated so cogent an interest in 
obtaining and making public” the membership information sought to 
be obtained as to “justify the substantial abridgment of associational 
freedom which such disclosures will effect.” 
Id. (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)) (emphasis added). 
 136 750 F.2d 89 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 137 Id. at 91–92. 
 138 Id. at 91. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 99. 
 142 Clark, 750 F.2d at 99. 
 143 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
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General of the United States, and nine special agents or employees of 
the FBI, installed wiretaps on telephones at the headquarters of the 
Jewish Defense League without prior judicial approval.144  The court 
held that it was necessary to obtain a warrant before installing the 
wiretaps.145  The court stated that prior judicial review is essential in 
order to protect the First Amendment rights of speech and associa-
tion of those who might be chilled by the fear of unsupervised and 
unlimited executive power to institute electronic surveillance.146
Most recently, the Supreme Court in Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale147 ruled that certain associations may discriminate against and 
exclude members.  The Court held that the Boy Scouts, a private, not-
for-profit organization, may exclude homosexuals because their con-
duct is inconsistent with the values that the Boy Scouts seek to instill 
in its members.148  The Court further stressed the importance of the 
First Amendment right to “associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cul-
tural ends,”149 finding that, “[t]his right is crucial in preventing the 
majority from imposing its views on groups that would rather express 
other, perhaps unpopular, ideas.”150  The Court’s decision acknowl-
edges the importance of the independence of a group and that the 
government should defer to the group to let it determine its mem-
bership and its message.151  Both Dale and NAACP emphasize self-
determination of groups in membership decisions and the right to 
protection from outside invasion, ultimately creating a “strong asso-
ciational right, combining both expressive and privacy elements.”152  
This ability to associate without interference is one of the fundamen-
tal bases of the American democracy.153
 144 Id. at 605. 
 145 Id. at 614.  The district court ruled that the Executive branch should deter-
mine whether electronic surveillance required a warrant because of a clear threat to 
a country’s foreign relations.  Id. at 607.  The appellate court disagreed, holding that 
even if the surveillance was for foreign intelligence gathering and national security 
purposes, a warrant was still needed.  Id. at 614. 
 146 Id. at 634–35. 
 147 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 148 Id. at 644. 
 149 Id. at 647 (quoting Roberts v. United States, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)). 
 150 Id. at 647−48. 
 151 See Fisher, supra note 126, at 641. 
 152 Id. at 641–42. 
 153 Id. at 642. 
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B. Injury in Fact 
Government surveillance can pose numerous harms to individ-
ual persons and groups as well as one’s freedom to associate with that 
group. The most obvious harm is that surveillance will hurt the repu-
tation of a particular group and, even worse, chill members’ voices 
within the group, ultimately weakening the group’s ability to express 
itself.154  The group may also be a target of surveillance because of an 
expressed political or religious view which is considered to be “ex-
tremist,” therefore rendering a member unable to state his or her be-
liefs for fear of governmental intervention.155  This political profiling 
creates broad sweeping surveillance and diverts the attention of law 
enforcement officials away from legitimate investigations.156  Investi-
gations of individuals tied to a suspect group may have the effect of 
distorting the group’s identity and message.157  Lastly, surveillance of 
a religious group’s rituals and other expressive activities undermines 
the independence of a person’s need to be free from the constraints 
of an all-conforming society.158
Specifically, the NSA program causes harm due to the lack of ju-
dicial oversight prior to surveillance.  This lack of judicial oversight 
allows the government to surveil specific persons or groups that it be-
lieves are agents of a foreign power or affiliated with a terrorist or-
ganization.159  Surveillance of groups who the government believes 
might have any contact with persons the government suspects—
perhaps even incorrectly—to be connected to terrorism will create a 
chilling effect and impinge upon one’s freedom of association.  
These people will not be able to associate with the group they choose 
due to the prospect of warrantless wiretapping by the government.160  
Under the government’s plan, the NSA can initiate surveillance on 
anyone for an unspecified duration, just because the supervisor be-
lieves that the person is associated with a terrorist group.161  This is a 
clear invasion of First Amendment rights, and the government does 
 154 George Kateb, The Value of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35, 53−54 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1998). 
 155 Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law 
After September 11, 2001:  The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. 
L. 295, 299–300 (2002). 
 156 Fisher, supra note 126, at 652. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 See supra notes 58–63. 
 160 See supra Part II.B. 
 161 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, 
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d. 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204). 
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have a compelling interest or that the program uses the least restric-
tive means of invasion. 
A central issue in ACLU v. NSA was whether plaintiffs, who did 
not know whether they were under surveillance, could demonstrate 
concrete “injury in fact” necessary to demonstrate standing.162  The 
district court held that the NSA program caused a concrete harm, 
which enabled the plaintiffs to satisfy the standing requirement.163  
The court of appeals, in a two to one split, reversed this decision, 
finding plaintiffs lacked standing.164  However, this Comment focuses 
on the district court’s argument that these plaintiffs can demonstrate 
standing and that plaintiffs in the future may also demonstrate stand-
ing.  A basic understanding of the rationale for finding that plaintiffs 
have standing is necessary to illustrate the limited class of plaintiffs 
who can invoke the First Amendment under the argument proposed 
by this Comment.  In ACLU v. NSA, the plaintiffs were a group of 
prominent journalists, scholars, attorneys, and non-profit organiza-
tions who frequently communicated by telephone to the Middle East 
and Asia.165  Some of these plaintiffs, based on the nature of their 
work, communicated with groups and individuals the U.S. govern-
ment believed to be associated with terrorist organizations.166  The 
plaintiffs, most specifically attorneys, suffered a concrete harm be-
cause they were unable to communicate with those individuals in 
connection with their work or, if they did communicate, ran the risk 
that the attorney-client privilege would be breached.167  Based on this 
reasoning, the plaintiffs were able to make a plausible argument that 
they could establish standing. 
Clearly, this Comment is not meant to imply that any citizen can 
argue that his or her speech is chilled based on the fear of investiga-
 162 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 771 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 163 Id. at 770.  The issue of standing arises in any case involving freedom of asso-
ciation and a subjective chill of speech.  See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (hold-
ing that a plaintiff does not have standing based on a mere belief that his speech has 
been chilled not by a specific action against them but by the existence and operation 
of a system designed to gather and distribute intelligence). 
 164 ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 165 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, 
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204). 
 166 Id. at 4. 
 167 Id. at 4–6.  The program has limited the ability of a professor to gain informa-
tion about sensitive matters, a journalist to gain information because of the fear that 
names will not remain anonymous, and an attorney to properly assist clients by not 
allowing contact with key witnesses.  Id. at 5–6.  The program also creates financial 
costs to all of these plaintiffs because they are unable to communicate over the tele-
phone and so must travel far distances in order to acquire vital information.  Id. at 6. 
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tion; rather, the citizen must be in a situation similar to the plaintiffs 
in ACLU v. NSA and show an objective, concrete harm.  This Com-
ment assumes that only those plaintiffs who can establish standing 
can argue that the NSA program violates their First Amendment as-
sociational rights. 
C. Compelling State Interest or Narrow Tailoring? 
It is clear that to justify a First Amendment violation the gov-
ernment must have a compelling state interest.168  The government is 
attempting to justify the NSA program on the compelling interest of 
national security.  However, the state interest of investigating terror-
ism and preventing future attacks cannot exist in a situation where 
evidence of criminal behavior is lacking.169  Mere suspicion of a par-
ticular group and political profiling cannot justify an intrusion into 
that group’s activities and membership.170  Danger to political dissent 
is heightened “where the Government attempts to act under so vague 
a concept as the power to protect ‘domestic security.’”171  It is so diffi-
cult to define national security that the risk of abuse is apparent.  Al-
lowing the executive branch to make its own decisions with regard to 
the needs of national security invites abuse of First Amendment 
rights, and public knowledge of this abuse can ultimately thwart the 
goal of national security.172  This is exactly the type of abuse that the 
government hoped to prevent by enacting FISA to stop a century of 
suspect presidential authority.173  Therefore, the guise of national se-
curity is no longer a legitimate enough interest to allow the executive 
to engage in warrantless surveillance of the American people. 
Due to the fear that has affected the American people since Sep-
tember 11, 2001, national security is a more compelling interest.  Yet, 
even if this interest is recognized by a court, the government needs to 
further justify the wholesale violation of First Amendment rights by 
the NSA program.  The government must meet the exacting scrutiny 
requirement by showing that the means of invasion are least intrusive.  
Here, the requirement of narrow tailoring is in no way met by the 
government.  The NSA program allows eavesdropping on any Ameri-
 168 See supra Part IV.A. 
 169 Fisher, supra note 126, at 662. 
 170 Id. 
 171 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S 297, 314 (1972). 
 172 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 
37–38, ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204) (cit-
ing Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 635−36 (1975)). 
 173 See supra notes 25−29 and accompanying text. 
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can who is believed to be linked to a terrorist group.174  Further, the 
NSA program is suspected of using data mining to collect informa-
tion about calls made by Americans who are not suspected of any 
crime.175  Exactly who the NSA program is spying on is unclear, but 
regardless, there are no safeguards in place to determine whether the 
particular target has engaged in an action to justify the surveillance.  
Thus, the NSA program violates both the compelling state interest 
and the narrow tailoring requirement.  However, because there may 
be a time when this interest is compelling enough and when the gov-
ernment narrows the scope of the program, it is necessary to address 
other First Amendment safeguards that may need to be put in place 
in foreign surveillance inquiries.  Part V of this Comment discusses 
the link between the First and Fourth Amendments and shows that 
the First Amendment needs its own independent inquiry, especially 
in light of the all-encompassing interest of national security. 
V. THE LINK BETWEEN THE FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS: 
APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS  
TO FIRST AMENDMENT INQUIRIES 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . 
. abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress 
of grievances.”176  The Fourth Amendment states that  
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.177
Although stopping physical entry into the home was the chief 
reason behind the enactment of the Fourth Amendment, its broader 
spirit now shields private speech from unreasonable surveillance.178  It 
is apparent that the Fourth Amendment is meant to protect First 
Amendment rights and that without proper Fourth Amendment 
compliance, First Amendment values are left vulnerable.  In national 
 174 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, 
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204). 
 175 See supra Part II.B. 
 176 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 177 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 178 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347 (1967); Berger v. New York 388 U.S. 41 
(1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S 505 (1961). 
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security cases there is a “convergence of First and Fourth Amendment 
values not present in cases of ‘ordinary’ crime.”179
A. “Scrupulous Exactitude” in Applying the Fourth Amendment 
In United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith),  the Court held that 
Fourth Amendment protections are especially necessary when the 
targets of surveillance are those suspected of unorthodoxy in their 
political beliefs. 180  The concept of protecting domestic security was 
so vague and there was such great difficulty in defining the domestic 
security interests that the Court believed dangers of abuse quite ap-
parent.181  The Court stated that American citizens should not be 
forced to curb their private discussions about the government based 
on the fear of unauthorized governmental eavesdropping.182  Yet the 
Court recognized that the government also has a great interest in 
protecting national security that must be weighed against the danger 
that unreasonable surveillance will place on freedom of expression.183  
Therefore according to Justice Douglas’s concurrence, in order to 
properly address both interests, a warrant should be issued by a neu-
tral magistrate and not be left to the sole discretion of the executive 
branch.184  The Court rejected the government’s arguments that a re-
quirement of prior judicial approval would impinge upon its ability to 
obtain intelligence and determined that, although there may be 
some burden on the attorney general in determining when a warrant 
should be granted, this use of a warrant is justified in order to protect 
constitutional values.185
 179 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S 297, 313 (1972) (addressing 
the question of the President’s power to authorize electronic surveillance in internal 
security matters without any prior judicial approval).  The Court held that despite 
government concerns, a departure from Fourth Amendment requirements of prior 
judicial approval was not justified in that instance.  Id. at 321.  The Court limited the 
scope of the decision to the specific aspect of national security, not extending the 
holding to foreign powers or their agents.  Id. at 321−22. 
 180 Id. at 313−14. 
 181 Id. at 314. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 314–15. 
 184 Keith, 407 U.S. at 325. (Douglas J., concurring).  Douglas joined the majority 
opinion; however, his concurrence gave a more in-depth analysis of the First 
Amendment implications in Fourth Amendment inquiries. 
 185 Id. at 320−21.  The government argued that requirement of prior judicial ap-
proval would hurt domestic security because the internal security matters are too 
subtle and complex for judicial evaluation and the element of secrecy would be lost.  
Id. 
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Although Keith was specifically limited to domestic security mat-
ters,186 it sufficiently laid out the argument that the First and Fourth 
Amendments are linked and that, especially in the context of surveil-
lance for national security matters, in the absence of prior judicial in-
volvement one’s First Amendment rights are vulnerable187  There are 
numerous other cases that show the importance of creating safe-
guards when First Amendment rights are at stake.188  When the gov-
ernment seeks to seize materials which may be protected by the First 
Amendment, the court issuing a warrant under the Fourth Amend-
ment must apply the warrant requirements with “scrupulous exacti-
tude.”189  “The commands of our First Amendment” teach that it is 
necessary to “safeguard[] not only privacy and protection against self-
incrimination but ‘conscience and human dignity and freedom of 
expression as well.’”190  Clearly, there is an extreme emphasis on the 
great need for precision when applying the Fourth Amendment to 
First Amendment inquiries. 
Two other cases also reinforce the idea that there needs to be 
judicial oversight in First Amendment analyses.  First, in Freedman v. 
Maryland,191 the Supreme Court reviewed a statute that proscribed the 
showing of a motion picture without first obtaining a license from the 
Maryland State Board.192  The Court held that this license require-
ment violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expres-
sion.193  In making this assessment, the Court determined that there 
was a lack of adequate safeguards to protect expression, reiterating 
that only a judicial determination ensures the necessary sensitivity to 
freedom of expression.194  In the second case, A Quantity of Books v. 
Kansas,195 the Court addressed a Kansas statute that authorized the 
seizure of allegedly obscene books before a determination of their 
 186 Id. at 321–22. 
 187 Id. 
 188 See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S 496 (1973); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 
U.S 51 (1965); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S 476 (1965); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 
378 U.S. 205 (1964). 
 189 Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485 (invalidating a warrant which authorized the search of 
a private home for books and materials relating to the Communist party and holding 
that the warrant must specifically list what is to be seized because of the delicate na-
ture of First Amendment rights). 
 190 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
 191 Freedman, 380 U.S. 51. 
 192 Id. at 52 & n.1. 
 193 Id. at 60–61. 
 194 Id. 
 195 378 U.S. 205 (1964). 
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obscenity.196  The Court found that this statute presented the danger 
of abridgment of the right of the public in a free society to unob-
structed circulation of nonobscene books.197  Both of these cases show 
that a prior judicial determination needs to be made when First 
Amendment rights are at stake.198  Yet the question still remains 
whether Fourth Amendment requirements can provide protection 
adequate to ensure that First Amendment rights are properly vindi-
cated or whether a separate First Amendment inquiry is required. 
B. Zurcher and Its Implications for the First Amendment 
Since both the Fourth and First Amendments are inextricably 
bound together, few courts have addressed the issue of whether the 
First Amendment needs additional safeguards aside from those al-
ready provided by the Fourth Amendment.  Yet, this question is of 
great importance when the government initiates warrantless surveil-
lance for national security matters.  It is especially important in situa-
tions, such as those present in ALCU v. NSA, where the government 
circumvents the Fourth Amendment requirement and even more 
important in situations where the Fourth Amendment is not asserted 
as an objection to the government’s action. 
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,199 the Supreme Court examined the 
question of whether the First Amendment required independent 
safeguards and found that there are no additional procedural safe-
guards needed to protect First Amendment rights if the Fourth 
Amendment is satisfied.200  In Zurcher, a student newspaper brought 
suit, alleging that a police search had violated its First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights because the scope of the warrant was 
overly broad and a newspaper’s headquarters should not be the sub-
ject of an innocent third-party search201 due to the confidential in-
 196 Id. at 206–07.  The warrant authorized the sheriff to seize all copies of the 
books, and the there was no hearing on the question of obscenity.  Id. at 207−08.  
The Court found these procedures insufficient because they did not adequately safe-
guard against the suppression of nonobscene books.  Id. at 207–08. 
 197 Id. at 208. 
 198 See id. at 212; Freedman, 380 U.S. at 60–61. 
 199 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The Police Department, after responding to a call to re-
move demonstrators, was forced to use drastic measures to calm people down.  Id. at 
550.  The Stanford Daily, a student newspaper, published photos alongside an article 
the next day.  Id. at 551.  The police secured a warrant to search the newspaper office 
for the photos, on the basis that the photos might help to identify the assailants.  Id. 
 200 Id. at 565−67. 
 201 Id. at 551–52. The newspaper published an article about a violent protest at a 
hospital, containing articles and photographs of the event.  Id. at 551.  There was “no 
allegation or indication that members of the Daily staff were in any way involved in 
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formation that it possesses.202  The district court held that where a 
newspaper is the subject of a third-party search, First Amendment in-
terests require that a search is permissible only “in the rare circum-
stance where there is a clear showing that 1) important materials will 
be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction; and 2) a restraining 
order would be futile.”203  This standard would place a precondition 
on the issuance of a warrant beyond just the requirement of probable 
cause.204  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.205
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether an 
innocent third-party search was justified where the newspaper was not 
the subject of a criminal investigation but materials obtained might 
aid in the investigation.206  The Court reversed the decision of the 
Court of Appeals, finding that “[n]either the Fourth Amendment nor 
the cases requiring consideration of First Amendment values in issu-
ing search warrants . . . call for imposing the regime ordered by the 
District Court.”207  The Court explained that by subjecting searches to 
a test of reasonableness and the requirement of the issuance of war-
rants by a neutral magistrate, First Amendment values are fully pro-
tected.208  The Court posited that “[t]here is no reason to believe” 
that a neutral magistrate could not guard against unreasonable 
searches, and if the magistrate follows “the requirements of specificity 
and reasonableness” for a warrant then no harm should occur.209
Zurcher ultimately stands for the proposition that when First 
Amendment values are at stake, the Fourth Amendment, when prop-
erly applied, can adequately protect these values and no further safe-
guards are needed. 210  Yet ACLU v. NSA shows that perhaps Zurcher 
needs to be reexamined in light of the NSA program, which does not 
comply with the Fourth Amendment requirement and independently 
violates the right of freedom of association.  Some concerns arise in 
the context of creating an independent First Amendment inquiry. 
unlawful acts at the hospital”; therefore, it was considered to be an innocent third 
party.  Id. 
 202 Id. at 551–52. 
 203 Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
 204 Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565. 
 205 Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464, 466 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 206 Zurcher, 436 U.S at 550. 
 207 Id. at 565. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. at 566. 
 210 Id. at 565−67. 
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C. The D.C. Circuit’s Concerns About Heightened First  
Amendment Standards 
In Reports Committee for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T Co.,211 Judge 
Wilkey of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit discussed the 
convergence of the First and Fourth Amendments and the conse-
quences of affording more procedural safeguards to protect First 
Amendment rights.212  The court attempted to answer the question of 
whether the First Amendment affords plaintiffs extra “privacy by im-
posing substantive or procedural limitations on good faith criminal 
investigat[ions] . . . beyond the limitations imposed by the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments.”213  The plaintiffs, a group of journalists, 
brought suit against two telephone companies, claiming that they 
were entitled to prior notice before their long-distance billing records 
were released to government officials.214  The court held that extra 
procedural safeguards are not necessary in the context of First 
Amendment investigations.215  Judge Wilkey stated that 
the guarantees of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments achieve their 
purpose and provide every individual with sufficient protection 
against good faith investigative action for the full enjoyment of his 
First Amendment rights of expression. To the extent an individ-
ual insists that he must shield himself from the prospect of good 
faith investigation and operate in secrecy in order to exercise ef-
fectively particular First Amendment liberties, he must find that 
shield and establish that secrecy within the framework of Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment protections.216
The court ruled that individuals who “desire to exercise their First 
Amendment rights” must operate in “the zone of privacy secured by 
the Fourth Amendment.”217  The court reasoned that “[w]hen indi-
viduals expose their activities to third parties, they similarly expose 
these activities to possible Government scrutiny.”218
 211 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979). 
 212 Id. at 1053. 
 213 Id. at 1054. 
 214 Id. at 1036. Telephone companies, including the defendants in Reporters Com-
mittee, have a practice of releasing long distance calls when they are the subject of a 
government investigation, but only after a valid subpoena or summons is issued and 
notification is given to the caller, unless it would impede the investigation.  Id. at 
1036–38. 
 215 Id. at 1058–59. 
 216 Id. at 1054 (emphasis added). 
 217 Reporters Comm., 593 F.2d at 1058. 
 218 Id. 
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In making the argument for no further First Amendment safe-
guards, Reporters Committee was concerned with newspapers and other 
media sources trying to immunize themselves from good faith inves-
tigation.219  The court stressed that problems would arise because of 
the necessity of separating journalists, reporters, and a limitless num-
ber of people from others, essentially making a decision that some 
individuals’ First Amendment rights are greater than others.220  The 
court believed that the law enforcement officers in each case would 
need to delineate the individuals and species of activity entitled to 
protection and that this additional requirement would place a great 
burden on law enforcement activities.221  Lastly, since all investigation 
is somewhat linked to the First Amendment, the court determined 
that it was extremely difficult and time consuming to separate those 
cases that involve First Amendment values and those that do not.222
At one point, both the concerns suggested by Judge Wilkey and 
the holding in Zurcher were well received; however, it is now necessary 
to reexamine both approaches in light of ACLU v. NSA.223  Based on 
ACLU, it is apparent that the NSA program is harming a certain class 
of plaintiffs subjected to warrantless surveillance.  The Fourth 
Amendment is not protecting these plaintiffs and other citizens un-
aware of the surveillance.  It is necessary to address the First Amend-
ment violations of the NSA program to show that adequate safe-
guards are not in place and that an independent inquiry is required. 
VI.  ANALYSIS 
A. Passing First Amendment Scrutiny:  The Warrant 
The only way that the government can legitimately interfere with 
the freedom of association is to show a compelling state interest in 
the investigation and that the means chosen to achieve that interest 
are the least restrictive.224  Since the government kept the NSA pro-
gram a secret, it is difficult to tell exactly who the targets of the sur-
veillance are and how the government determines that that person is 
a foreign agent or a terrorist.  The government argues that it imple-
mented the program based on a genuine compelling state interest 
and that the program is the least restrictive of First Amendment 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. at 1060. 
 223 See supra Part III.B. 
 224 See ALCU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 758, 776 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
THISTLE_FINAL 6/12/2008  12:07:22 PM 
1226 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1197 
 
rights.225  The government denies that the program engages in broad 
sweeping surveillance of all Americans.226
Regardless of the target of the surveillance, the government still 
needs to show a compelling interest in invading the right to freedom 
of association.  The government has a great interest in preventing 
terrorism, especially after the attacks of 2001.  Investigations are use-
ful in gathering intelligence data for national security, and the lack of 
intelligence was a major cause of the September 11 attacks.227  Yet in-
telligence needs to be limited to and focused on areas that will be the 
most likely to yield information about terrorists.228  To state the obvi-
ous, simply because a group is engaged in non-mainstream political 
or religious activity does not prove that the group is involved in a 
crime or, for that matter, that it is likely to do so.229  The government 
cannot engage in sweeping surveillance under the justification that 
every person may be linked to a terrorist cell.  This would be point-
less, but even worse, it would violate the First Amendment, since even 
with this current threat there is no justification for complete defer-
ence to the executive branch with respect to associational rights.230  
The government must meet exacting scrutiny, showing a compelling 
interest with the least restrictive means to justify this invasion. 
The easiest way for the government to show that it has a compel-
ling state interest that is narrowly tailored is to obtain a warrant.  This 
would show an interest more particularized than national security in 
the abstract and prove that the government is not engaging in sweep-
ing surveillance.  By complying with the procedures set out by FISA 
for obtaining a warrant, the government would allow the court to 
make a prior judicial determination that the surveillance is reason-
able and that the government has met all of the FISA criteria.  If the 
government’s interest is legitimate, it will almost always be able to se-
cure a warrant.231  Also, as previously discussed, the Supreme Court 
has already determined that because of the warrant requirement,  
 225 NSA Myths, supra note 56. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Deborah Solomon, Questions for Tom Kean:  Want to Know a Secret?, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Jan 4, 2004, at 9. (“[T]here is a good chance that 9/11 could have been pre-
vented by any number of people along the way.  Everybody pretty well agrees our in-
telligence agencies were not set up to deal with domestic terrorism.”). 
 228 Fisher, supra note 126, at 657. 
 229 See Adam Liptak, The Nation:  Prisons to Mosques; Hate Speech and the American 
Way, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004, at 3. 
 230 See ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 758, 775−76 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 231 See supra Part II.A. 
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FISA does not violate one’s freedom of association.232  A warrant 
would clearly satisfy this narrow tailoring requirement because the 
use of prior judicial adjudication is exactly what the Supreme Court 
contemplated as adequate First Amendment protection—that is, that 
the Fourth Amendment needs to be applied with “scrupulous exacti-
tude.”233
By obtaining a warrant, the government would show exactly who 
is a target of the surveillance and that there is a reasonable belief that 
the target is a threat to national security or a member of a foreign 
group suspected of engaging in terrorism.  The government will most 
likely argue that obtaining a warrant is too burdensome and restricts 
the type of surveillance that is necessary in order to protect national 
security.234  However, Keith, though admittedly in the domestic con-
text, weighed both the privacy interests of citizens and the national 
security interest of the government and determined that in order to 
properly address both interests a warrant should be issued by a neu-
tral magistrate instead of giving the executive the sole discretion in 
the realm of surveillance.235  This same reasoning holds true in the 
context of foreign surveillance—the competing interests must be bal-
anced and the most rational way to ensure that both interests are pro-
tected is to require a warrant. 
B. Other Potential Safeguards 
Although obtaining a warrant appears to be the simplest way to 
resolve the problem of foreign surveillance and protection of free-
dom of association, the government appears to believe otherwise.236  
If the government’s belief becomes a reality, freedom of association 
may not be properly protected.  If the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement is not properly applied or is somehow bypassed, then 
First Amendment values are left vulnerable.  The First Amendment 
relies heavily on Fourth Amendment protections.  Although the First 
Amendment requires a compelling state interest and narrow tailor-
ing,237 this whole inquiry can sometimes be forgone under the guise 
 232 See supra Part III.B. 
 233 See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S 476, 485 (1965); see also A Quantity of Books v. 
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
 234 See NSA Myths, supra note 56.  “The NSA program is an ‘early warning system’” 
and is “a program with a military nature that requires speed and agility.”  Id. 
 235 See supra notes 180−90 and accompanying text.   
 236 See supra Part II.C (proposed amendments to FISA would do away with the re-
quirement of a warrant). 
 237 See supra Part IV.A. 
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of national security.238  Therefore, when the Fourth Amendment is 
not providing adequate protections, or when the government is sim-
ply avoiding it, the First Amendment needs some separate inquiry of 
its own in order to protect independent associational values.  This 
analysis will become necessary if the government can show that the 
warrant requirement is too burdensome or that somehow the NSA 
program still satisfies the Fourth Amendment, even without a war-
rant.  Furthermore, this Comment proposes that these safeguards 
apply only to situations similar to ACLU v. NSA and national security 
surveillance, not to all First Amendment inquiries. 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T Co.239 raised 
concerns that prevented the court from recognizing First Amend-
ment rights independent of the Fourth Amendment.  These concerns 
would not exist in the context of NSA surveillance as demonstrated 
by ACLU v. NSA.  The first concern that newspapers will try to immu-
nize themselves from all surveillance240 is not related to foreign sur-
veillance and is therefore easily dismissed.  The second concern of 
Reporters Committee, that all investigation is linked to the First Amend-
ment,241 can also be dismissed in this instance.  This Comment pro-
poses that more First Amendment safeguards are necessary only in 
the context of the NSA program.  Therefore, this would limit the 
concern that all investigation is related to the First Amendment and 
thus subjected to more safeguards, since this heightened inquiry 
would apply only to the NSA program.  Thus the example of ACLU v. 
NSA can justify the argument that a separate First Amendment in-
quiry is necessary, showing that the twenty-eight-year-old Reporters 
Committee holding needs to be revised in light of the changing nature 
of surveillance and the limitless invasion of privacy.242
Another reason Zurcher and the concerns expressed in Reporters 
Committee should not apply in the NSA surveillance context is that in 
both of these instances some sort of warrant was issued.243  In ACLU v. 
NSA, there was no warrant issued,244 which allowed the government to 
instead engage in any type of surveillance that it deemed in the best 
interest of national security.245  This is easily distinguishable from 
 238 See supra Part IV.A. 
 239 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979). 
 240 Id. at 1060. 
 241 Id. at 1059. 
 242 ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 775–76 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 243 See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 551 (1978); Reporters Comm., 593 
F.2d at 1040. 
 244 ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 758. 
 245 See id. 
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Zurcher, in which a warrant was issued based on probable cause.246  
The initial safeguard of a warrant is not even in place under the NSA 
program.  In the NSA program it is impossible to determine if the in-
vestigation is conducted in good faith because no warrant is issued—a 
judge never oversees any aspect of the surveillance. 
This Comment does not propose total elimination of surveil-
lance because that would defeat the purpose of investigation in the 
first place, but rather tries to ensure a sound reason for subjecting a 
particular person or group to surveillance.  Based on the needs for 
protection, this Comment proposes that the First Amendment re-
quires a separate inquiry, independent of the Fourth Amendment in 
the area of surveillance for national security measures.  The easiest 
way to safeguard First Amendment interests is to heighten the re-
quirements of the test already in place, which calls for a compelling 
government interest and the least restrictive means of achieving that 
interest.  Instead of reviewing surveillance under the strict scrutiny 
standard to determine whether an individual’s freedom of association 
has been violated in a post hoc manner, strict scrutiny review should 
be applied prior to allowing the surveillance.  Normally, if one be-
lieves that his freedom of association has been infringed upon, he 
must go to court to force the government to show that the govern-
ment surveillance can survive strict scrutiny review.  However, strict 
scrutiny review should be applied prior to the invasion of associa-
tional rights.  Before the government can engage in surveillance, it 
should present evidence to show that it has a compelling state inter-
est and that the means used to achieve that interest are the least in-
trusive.  The easiest way to meet this standard is to obtain a warrant, 
which will almost automatically satisfy both prongs of the test.  How-
ever, if the government chooses not to engage in the supposed bur-
den of obtaining a warrant, it can submit a document that describes 
why the surveillance is necessary and the potential targets of the sur-
veillance before a committee, or perhaps even a separate branch of 
the FISA court.  This branch would produce a much quicker turn-
around than the warrant procedure because this specific committee 
would only review these particular applications.  This requirement 
would need to be compelled by a statute in order to force the gov-
ernment to comply.  This suggested standard of review applies a 
Fourth Amendment standard to a First Amendment inquiry, even 
when a Fourth Amendment challenge is not at issue.  This standard 
would apply only to the unique situation presented in ACLU v. NSA, 
 246 436 U.S at 551. 
THISTLE_FINAL 6/12/2008  12:07:22 PM 
1230 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1197 
and would not extend to other types of surveillance or other First 
Amendment issues. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is apparent after the decision in ACLU v. NSA, and the revela-
tion of the President’s secret wiretapping program, that American 
citizens’ First Amendment rights are being violated.  The President’s 
illegal encroachment into citizens’ privacy is not a new problem; 
however, the implementation of FISA supposedly brought an end to 
the century-long problem.  Yet the NSA program is not only bypass-
ing FISA and the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement before 
engaging in this surveillance, it is completely ignoring First Amend-
ment associational rights. 
First, it is clear that there is a First Amendment violation. The 
particular plaintiffs are being harmed in their freedom to associate 
with groups and ultimately are chilled from engaging in their work 
and various other aspects of their lives.  The government does not 
present a compelling interest other than national security, which may 
be too broad to adequately protect Americans.  Even further, if the 
compelling interest is accepted, the NSA program fails the narrow tai-
loring requirement of First Amendment heightened scrutiny.  The 
First Amendment requirement becomes even greater in matters of 
national security.  Therefore, there is an apparent constitutional vio-
lation that needs to be addressed. 
This Comment brings to light the fact that when Fourth 
Amendment protections are pushed aside, First Amendment rights 
are left with little protection of their own.  Although in Zurcher and 
Reporters Committee, the courts rejected the argument that First 
Amendment rights receive more protection, these cases need to be 
reexamined in light of the NSA program.  The concerns suggested in 
both cases are not present in the context of the NSA program.  This 
Comment is limited to this particular situation and does not address 
the broad issue of government surveillance for all national security 
matters. 
Based on the First Amendment failings, this Comment proposes 
first that the government can meet both prongs of exacting scrutiny 
by obtaining a warrant.  This would ensure that the governmental in-
terest of national security is narrowly tailored and only those persons 
who are truly foreign agents and for whom there is probable cause to 
target are under surveillance.  However, if the government does not 
feel it can comply with the warrant requirement, then it is necessary 
that the First Amendment be detached from the Fourth Amendment 
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and have an independent inquiry of its own.  This procedure would 
essentially take the strict scrutiny standard and apply it ex ante as op-
posed to ex post, thus ensuring that First Amendment rights are not 
violated and that the government is not engaging in widespread war-
rantless wiretapping.  This approach would curb many of the execu-
tive’s illegal activities, meet the Executive’s concerns for national se-
curity, and honor First Amendment association rights. 
 
